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Abstract 
 Optimizing a given metric is a central aspect of most current 
AI approaches, yet overemphasizing metrics leads to 
manipulation, gaming, a myopic focus on short-term goals, 
and other unexpected negative consequences. This poses a 
fundamental challenge in the use and development of AI. 
We first review how metrics can go wrong in practice and 
aspects of how our online environment and current business 
practices are exacerbating these failures. We put forward 
here an evidence based framework that takes steps toward 
mitigating the harms caused by overemphasis of metrics 
within AI by: (1) using a slate of metrics to get a fuller and 
more nuanced picture, (2) combining metrics with 
qualitative accounts, and (3) involving a range of 
stakeholders, including those who will be most impacted. 
 Introduction
1  
  
Metrics can play a central role in decision making across 
data driven organizations and their advantages and 
disadvantages have been widely studied (Likierman 2009, 
Kaplan and Norton 1992). Metrics play an even more 
central role in AI algorithms and as such their risks and 
disadvantages are heightened. Some of the most alarming 
instances of AI algorithms run amok, such as 
recommendation algorithms contributing to radicalization 
(Ribeiro et. al. 2019), teachers described as “creative and 
motivating” being fired by an algorithm (Tuque 2012), or 
essay grading software that rewards sophisticated garbage 
(Ramineni and Williamson 2018) all result from over-
emphasizing metrics. We have to understand this dynamic 
in order to understand the urgent risks we are facing due to 
misuse of AI. 
 At their heart, what most current AI approaches do is to 
optimize metrics. The practice of optimizing metrics is not 
 
 
new nor unique to AI, yet AI can be particularly efficient 
(even too efficient!) at doing so. This unreasonable 
effectiveness at optimizing metrics  results in one of the 
grand challenges in AI design and ethics: the metric 
optimization central to AI often leads to manipulation, 
gaming, a focus on short-term quantities (at the expense of 
longer-term concerns), and other undesirable 
consequences, particularly when done in an environment 
designed to exploit people’s impulses and weaknesses. 
Moreover, this challenge also yields, in parallel, an equally 
grand contradiction in AI development: optimizing metrics 
results in far from optimal outcomes.  
 Some of the issues with metrics are captured by 
Goodhart’s Law, “When a measure becomes a target, it 
ceases to be a good measure” (Goodhart 2015 and 
Strathern 1997). We examine in this paper, through a 
review of a series of real-world case studies, how 
Goodhart’s Law as well as additional consequences of AI’s 
reliance on optimizing metrics is already having an impact 
in society. We find from this review the  following well 
supported principles: 
• Any metric is just a proxy for what you really care about 
• Metrics can, and will, be gamed 
• Metrics tend to overemphasize short-term concerns 
• Many online metrics are gathered in highly addictive 
environments 
 Given the harms of over-emphasizing metrics, it is 
important to work to mitigate these issues which will 
remain in most use cases of AI. We conclude by proposing 
a framework for the healthier use of metrics that includes: 
• Use a slate of metrics to get a fuller picture 
• Combine metrics with qualitative accounts 
• Involve a range of stakeholders, including those who 
will be most impacted 
     Goodhart’s Law and Machine Learning 
Goodhart’s Law is often given as one of the limitations of 
metrics: a measure (or metric) that becomes a target ceases 
to be a good measure. This is a fundamental challenge with 
metrics. The formal mathematical definition of a metric 
(Rosenlicht, 1968) is a rule that, for each pair of elements 
p and q in a set E, associates to them a real-number d(p,q), 
which has the following properties: 
• d(p,q) ≥ 0  
• d(p,q) = 0 if and only if p = q 
• d(p,q) = d(q,p) for all p and q in the set 
• d(p,r) ≥  d(p,q) + d(q,r) 
A metric can be used to measure the magnitude of any 
element in the set for which it is defined, by evaluating the 
distance between that element and zero.  
 This concept of a metric for an organization is often used 
interchangeably with key performance indicators (KPI) 
which can be defined as “the quantifiable measures an 
organization uses to determine how well it meets its 
declared operational and strategic goals” (Schrage 2018). 
In practice metrics and KPIs are also used more generally 
to refer to measurements made in the realm of software 
products or business, such as page views/impressions, click 
through rates, time spent watching, quarterly earnings, and 
more.  Here, metric is used to refer to something which can 
be measured and quantified as a numeric value. Although 
they are not identical, the mathematical definition of metric 
(which is relevant for formal machine learning work that 
involves optimization for a cost or loss function) is very 
much linked to the more informal business usage of the 
term metric. 
 Machine learning has been defined as follows: “A 
computer program is said to learn from experience E with 
respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure 
P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, 
improves with experience E” (Mitchell 1997, as quoted in 
Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville 2016).  Here, the 
performance measure P must be a well-defined 
quantitative measure, such as accuracy or error rate.  
Defining and choosing this measure can involve a number 
of choices, such as whether to give partial credit for some 
answers, how to weigh false positives relative to false 
negatives, the penalties for frequent medium mistakes 
relative to rare large mistakes, and more. 
 In the context of deep learning, according to 
Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville (2016), training a 
model is the process of: 
finding the parameters θ of a neural network that 
significantly reduce a cost function J(θ), which 
typically includes a performance measure evaluated 
on the entire training set as well as additional 
regularization terms 
That is, model training is explicitly defined around this 
process of optimizing a particular metric (in this case, 
minimizing cost). 
 Goodhart’s Law, that a measure that becomes a target 
ceases to be a good measure, remains a relevant lens to see 
the shortcomings of AI’s reliance on metrics. This law has 
appeared in various forms since economist Charles 
Goodhart first proposed it in 1975 in response to how 
monetary metrics broke down after central banks adopted 
them as targets. This arose out of attempts in the early 
1970s to control inflation by choosing metrics with a stable 
relationship to inflation as targets. Central banks from a 
number of countries did this, and in most cases the 
relationship between inflation and the metric chosen broke 
down once that metric became a target. In his entry on 
Goodhart’s Law in The Encyclopedia of Central Banking 
(Goodhart 2015), Goodhart refers to the popular phrasing 
of his namesake law, “When a measure becomes a target, 
it ceases to be a good measure” (Strathern 1997). Note that 
the target of training a deep learning model is often defined 
as improving or optimizing our cost function J(θ). That is, 
by definition, deep learning is a process in which a 
measure is the target. Thus, there is an increased likelihood 
that any risks of optimizing metrics are heightened by AI 
(Slee 2019), and Goodhart’s Law grows increasingly 
relevant. 
 
Previous related work 
 
As part of a much broader survey of the field of AI ethics, 
Green (2018), refers to concerns of “Goodharting” the 
explanation function; for instance, if an algorithm learns 
to produce answers that humans find appealing as 
opposed to accurate answers.  
 Work by Manheim and Garrabrant (2019) develops a 
taxonomy of 4 distinct failure modes that are all contained 
in Goodhart’s Law.  Here Goodhart’s law is framed in 
terms of a metric being chosen as a proxy for a goal, and 
the collapse that occurs with that proxy as a target:  (1) 
regressional Goodhart, in which the difference between 
the proxy and the goal is important, (2) extremal 
Goodhart, in which the relationship between the proxy 
and the goal is different when taken to an extreme, (3) 
causal Goodhart, in which there is a non-causal 
relationship between the proxy and goal, and intervening 
on one may fail to impact the other, (4) adversarial 
Goodhart, in which adversaries attempt to game the 
chosen proxy.  The authors then provide subcategories 
within causal Goodhart, based off of different underlying 
relationships between the proxy and the goal, and 
different subcategories of adversarial Goodhart, based on 
the behavior of the regulator and the agent.  Mathematical 
formulations for the failure modes are presented. 
 A related issue is “reward hacking” in which an 
algorithm games its reward function, learning a “clever” 
way of optimizing the function which subverts the 
designer/programmer’s intent.  This is most often talked 
about in the field of reinforcement learning.  For example, 
in a reimplementation of AlphaGo, the computer player 
learned to pass forever if passing was an allowed move. 
Victoria Krakovna maintains a spreadsheet with dozens of 
such examples (Krakovna 2019). While this is a subset of 
the type of cases we will consider, reward hacking 
typically refers to the algorithm’s internal behavior, 
whereas here we are primarily interested in systems that 
involve a mix of human and algorithmic behavior. 
 The issue of over optimizing single metrics is so 
worrisome that recent work (Taylor 2016) has suggested 
replacing direct optimization with “q-quantilizers” which 
practically attempt to replace offering the deterministic 
highest utility maximizer with random alternatives 
weighted by their utility.  The idea purports to mitigates 
Goodharting but at the cost of lower utility and is 
sensitive to how well understood what a “safe” base 
distribution of actions looks like. Slee (2019) goes further 
to state that in many cases AI’s reliance on pure incentive 
maximization is incompatible with actually achieving 
optimal outcomes for the intended use cases. 
 Our goal here is to elucidate different characteristics of 
how Goodhart’s Law manifests in a series of real-world 
cases studies, aspects of how our online environment and 
current business practices are exacerbating these failures, 
and propose a framework towards mitigating the harms 
caused by overemphasis of metrics within AI. 
 
We can’t measure the things that matter 
most 
 
Metrics are typically just a proxy for what we really care 
about. Mullainathan and Obermeyer (2017), cover an 
interesting example: the researchers investigate which 
factors in someone’s electronic medical record are most 
predictive of a future stroke and find that several of the 
most predictive factors (such as accidental injury, a 
benign breast lump, or colonoscopy) don’t make sense as 
risk factors for stroke. It turned out that the model was 
simply identifying people who utilize health care a lot. 
They didn’t actually have data of who had a stroke (a 
physiological event in which regions of the brain are 
denied new oxygen); they had data about who had access 
to medical care, chose to go to a doctor, were given the 
needed tests, and had this billing code added to their 
chart. But a number of factors influence this process: who 
has health insurance or can afford their co-pay, who can 
take time off of work or find childcare, gender and racial 
biases that impact who gets accurate diagnoses, cultural 
factors, and more. As a result, the model was largely 
picking out people who utilized healthcare versus who did 
not. 
 This an example of the common phenomenon of having 
to use proxies: You want to know what content users like, 
so you measure what they click on. You want to know 
which teachers are most effective, so you measure their 
students test scores. You want to know about crime, so 
you measure arrests. These things are not the same. Many 
things we do care about cannot be measured. Metrics can 
be helpful, but we can’t forget that they are just proxies.
 As another example, Google used hours spent watching 
YouTube as a proxy for how happy users were with the 
content, writing on the Google blog that “If viewers are 
watching more YouTube, it signals to us that they’re 
happier with the content they’ve found” (Meyerson 2012). 
Guillaume Chaslot, founder of independent watch group 
AlgoTransparency and an AI engineer who formerly 
worked at Google/YouTube, shares how this had the side 
effect of incentivizing conspiracy theories, since 
convincing users that the rest of the media is lying kept 
them watching more YouTube (Chaslot 2018). 
 
Metrics can, and will, be gamed 
 
It is almost inevitable that metrics will be gamed, 
particularly when they are given too much power. A 
detailed case study about “a system of governance of 
public services that combined targets with an element of 
terror” developed for England’s health care system in the 
2000s covers many ways that gaming can occur (Bevan 
and Hood 2006).  The authors identify three well-
documented forms of gaming from Soviet era production 
targets: (1) ratchet effects: ‘a wise director fulfils the plan 
105%, but never 125%', (2) threshold effects: crowd 
distribution towards target, (3) output distortions: achieve 
targets at the cost of significant but unmeasured aspects of 
performance.  They then detail many specific examples of 
how gaming manifested in the English healthcare system. 
For example, targets around emergency department wait 
times led some hospitals to cancel scheduled operations in 
order to draft extra staff to the emergency room, to 
require patients to wait in queues of ambulances, and to 
turn stretchers into “beds” by putting them in hallways.  
There were also significant discrepancies in numbers 
reported by hospitals versus those reported by patients; 
for instance, around wait times, according to official 
numbers 90% of patients were seen in less than 4 hours, 
but only 69% of patients said they were seen in less than 4 
hours when surveyed (Bevan and Hood 2006). 
 As education policy in the United States began over-
emphasizing student test scores as the primary way to 
evaluate teachers, there have been widespread scandals of 
teachers and principals cheating by altering students’ 
scores, in Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, 
Virginia, Texas, and elsewhere (Gabriel 2010). One 
consequence of this is that teachers who don’t cheat may 
be penalized or even fired, when it appears student test 
scores have dropped to more average levels under their 
instruction (Turque 2012). When metrics are given undue 
importance, attempts to game those metrics become 
common. 
 A modern AI case study can be drawn from 
recommendation systems, which are widely used across 
many platforms to rank and promote content for users. 
Platforms are rife with attempts to game their algorithms, 
to show up higher in search results or recommended 
content, through fake clicks, fake reviews, fake followers, 
and more (Tufekci 2019).  There are entire marketplaces 
for purchasing fake reviews and fake followers, etc. 
 During one week in April 2019, Chaslot collected 
84,695 videos from YouTube and analyzed the number of 
views and the number of channels from which they were 
recommended (Harwell and Timberg 2019).  
The state-owned media outlet Russia Today, abbreviated 
RT, was an extreme outlier in how much YouTube’s 
algorithm had selected it to be recommended by a wide-
variety of other YouTube channels. According to Harwell 
(2019): 
Chaslot said in an interview that while the RT video 
ultimately did not get massive viewership — only 
about 55,000 views — the numbers of 
recommendations suggest that Russians have grown 
adept at manipulating YouTube’s algorithm, which 
uses machine-learning software to surface videos it 
expects viewers will want to see. The result, Chaslot 
said, could be a gradual, subtle elevation of Russian 
views online because such videos result in more 
recommendations and, ultimately, more views that 
can generate more advertising revenue and reach. 
 
Automatic essay grading software currently used in at 
least 22 USA states focuses primarily on metrics like 
sentence length, vocabulary, spelling, and subject-verb 
agreement, but is unable to evaluate aspects of writing  
that are hard to quantify, such as creativity. As a result, 
gibberish essays randomly generated by computer 
programs to contain lots of sophisticated words score  
well. Essays from students in mainland China, which do 
well on essay length and sophisticated word choice, 
received higher scores from the algorithms than from 
expert human graders, suggesting that these students may 
be using chunks of pre-memorized text (Ramineni and 
Williamson, 2018). 
 
Metrics overemphasize short-term concerns 
 It is much easier to measure short-term quantities: click 
through rates, month-over-month churn, quarterly 
earnings. Many long-term trends have a complex mix of 
factors and are tougher to quantify. While short-term 
incentives have led YouTube’s algorithm to promote 
pedophilia (Fisher and Taub 2019), white supremacy 
(Ribeiro et. al. 2019), and flat-earth theories (Landrum 
2018), the long-term impact on user trust will not be 
positive. Similarly, Facebook has been the subject of 
years worth of privacy scandals, political manipulation, 
and facilitating genocide (Vaidhyanathan 2018), which is 
now having a longer-term negative impact on Facebook’s 
ability to recruit new engineers (Bowles 2018). 
 Simply measuring what users click on is a short-term 
concern, and does not take into account factors like the 
potential long-term impact of a long-form investigative 
article which may have taken months to research and 
which could help shape a reader’s understanding of a 
complex issue and even lead to significant societal 
changes. 
 The Wells Fargo account fraud scandal provides a case 
study of how letting metrics replace strategy can harm a 
business (Harris and Tayler 2019). After identifying 
cross-selling as a measure of long-term customer 
relationships, Wells Fargo went overboard emphasizing 
the cross-selling metric: intense pressure on employees 
combined with an unethical sales culture led to 3.5 
million fraudulent deposit and credit card accounts being 
opened without customers’ consent. The metric of cross-
selling is a much more short-term concern compared to 
the loftier goal of nurturing long-term customer 
relationships. Overemphasizing metrics removes our 
focus from long-term concerns such as our values, trust 
and reputation, and our impact on society and the 
environment, and myopically focuses on the short-term. 
 
Many metrics gather data of what we do in 
highly addictive environments 
It matters which metrics we gather and in what 
environment we do so. Metrics such as what users click on, 
how much time they spend on sites, and “engagement” are 
heavily relied on by tech companies as proxies for user 
preference, and are used to drive important business 
decisions. Unfortunately, these metrics are gathered in 
environments engineered to be highly addictive, laden with 
dark patterns, and where financial and design decisions 
have already greatly circumscribed the range of options. 
 While this is not a characteristic inherent to metrics, it is 
a current reality of many of the metrics used by tech 
companies today. A large-scale study analyzing 
approximately 11K shopping websites found 1,818 dark 
patterns present on 1,254 websites, 11.1% of the total sites 
(Mathur, et. al. 2019). These dark patterns included 
obstruction, misdirection, and misrepresenting user 
actions.  The study found that more popular websites were 
more likely to feature these dark patterns.  
 Zeynep Tufekci compares recommendation algorithms 
(such as YouTube choosing which videos to auto-play for 
you and Facebook deciding what to put at the top of your 
newsfeed) to a cafeteria shoving junk food into children’s 
faces (Lewis 2018): 
This is a bit like an autopilot cafeteria in a school that 
has figured out children have sweet-teeth, and also 
like fatty and salty foods. So you make a line offering 
such food, automatically loading the next plate as 
soon as the bag of chips or candy in front of the young 
person has been consumed. 
 
 As those selections get normalized, the output becomes 
ever more extreme: “So the food gets higher and higher in 
sugar, fat and salt – natural human cravings – while the 
videos recommended and auto-played by YouTube get 
more and more bizarre or hateful.” 
 Too many of our online environments are like this, with 
metrics capturing that we love sugar, fat, and salt, not 
taking into account that we are in the digital equivalent of 
a food desert and that companies haven’t been required to 
put nutrition labels on what they are offering. Such 
metrics are not indicative of what we would prefer in a 
healthier or more empowering environment. 
A Framework for a Healthier Use of Metrics 
All this is not to say that we should throw metrics out 
altogether. Data can be valuable in helping us understand 
the world, test hypotheses, and move beyond gut instincts 
or hunches. Metrics can be useful when they are in their 
proper context and place. We propose a few mechanisms 
for addressing these issues: 
• Use a slate of metrics to get a fuller picture 
• Combine with qualitative accounts 
• Involve a range of stakeholders, including those who 
will be most impacted 
Use a slate of metrics to get a fuller picture and reduce 
gaming 
One way to keep metrics in their place is to consider a slate 
of many metrics for a fuller picture (and resist the 
temptation to try to boil these down to a single score). For 
instance, knowing the rates at which tech companies hire 
people from under-indexed groups is a very limited data 
point. For evaluating diversity and inclusion at tech 
companies, we need to know comparative promotion rates, 
cap table ownership, retention rates (many tech companies 
are revolving doors driving people from under-indexed 
groups away with their toxic cultures), number of 
harassment victims silenced by NDAs, rates of under-
leveling, and more. Even then, all this data should still be 
combined with listening to first-person experiences of 
those working at these companies. 
 Likierman wrote in Harvard Business Review (2009) 
that using a diverse slate of metrics is one strategy to avoid 
gaming: 
It helps to diversify your metrics, because it’s a lot 
harder to game several of them at once. [International 
law firm] Clifford Chance replaced its single metric 
of billable hours with seven criteria on which to base 
bonuses: respect and mentoring, quality of work, 
excellence in client service, integrity, contribution to 
the community, commitment to diversity, and 
contribution to the firm as an institution. 
 
Likierman (2009) also cites the example of Japanese 
telecommunications company SoftBank using 
performance metrics defined for three distinct time 
horizons to make them harder to game. 
Combine with Qualitative Accounts 
Columbia professor and New York Times Chief Data 
Scientist Chris Wiggins wrote that quantitative measures 
should always be combined with qualitative information, 
“Since we cannot know in advance every phenomenon 
users will experience, we cannot know in advance what 
metrics will quantify these phenomena. To that end, data 
scientists and machine learning engineers must partner 
with or learn the skills of user experience research, giving 
users a voice” (Wiggins 2018). 
 Proposals such as Model Cards for Model Reporting 
(Mitchell, et. al. 2019) and Datasheets for Datasets (Gebru 
2018) can be viewed in line with this thinking.  These 
works acknowledge that the metrics typically 
accompanying models, such as performance on a particular 
dataset, are insufficient to cover the many complex 
interactions that can occur in real-world use, as the model 
is applied to different populations and in different use 
cases, and as the use potentially veers away from the initial 
intent. Mitchell (2019) and Gebru (2018) propose 
documenting much richer and more comprehensive details 
about a given model or dataset, including more qualitative 
aspects, such as intended use cases, ethical considerations, 
underlying assumptions, caveats, and more.  
Involve a range of stakeholders, including those who 
will be most impacted 
Another key to keeping metrics in their proper place is to 
keep domain experts and those who will be most impacted 
closely involved in their development and use. 
Empowering a diverse group of stakeholders to understand 
the implications and underlying assumptions of AI models 
is one of the goals of Model Cards for Model Reporting 
(Mitchell et al. 2018). We suggest going even further and 
including these stakeholders in the initial development 
process of these metrics in the first place. 
 Tool 3 in the Markkula Center’s Ethical Toolkit for 
Engineering/Design Practice (Vallor, Green, and Raicu 
2018) is to “expand the ethical circle” to include the input 
of all stakeholders. They suggest a number of questions to 
ask about this topic, including: 
• Whose interests, desires, skills, experiences and values 
have we simply assumed, rather than actually consulted? 
Why have we done this, and with what justification? 
• Who are all the stakeholders who will be directly 
affected by our product? How have their interests been 
protected? How do we know what their interests really 
are—have we asked? 
• Who/which groups and individuals will be indirectly 
affected in significant ways? How have their interests 
been protected? How do we know what their interests 
really are—have we asked?  
 
While their focus is on tech policy, the Diverse Voices 
paper (Young, Magassa, and Friedman 2019) provides a 
detailed methodology on how to elicit the expertise and 
feedback of underrepresented populations that would be 
useful in improving the design and implementation of 
metrics. 
 An additional argument for the importance of including 
a range of stakeholders comes from the fragile and elastic 
nature of deep learning algorithms combined with the 
incompatible incentives the owners of these algorithms 
have to address this fragility (Slee 2019). Specifically: 
…if subjects follow their incentives then the algorithm 
ceases to function as designed. To sustain their accuracy, 
algorithms need external rules to limit permissible 
responses. These rules form a set of guardrails which 
implement value judgments, keeping algorithms 
functioning by constraining the actions of subjects. 
Slee proposes that external guardrails on how users are 
allowed to engage with the algorithms are a necessary 
corrective measure for the associated gaming and abuses 
cited above, but that the algorithm owners themselves are 
incentivized to create guardrails that don’t align with their 
algorithms, an act of regulatory arbitrage. Given that 
guardrails are a restriction on the user, transparent and just 
corrective measures will depend on how effective the 
ethical circle has been expanded in the design and creation 
of the guardrails.  Slee gives the example of the 
incompatible incentives Facebook faces in addressing 
ethical issues with its News Feed Algorithm, and suggests 
that journalists not tempted by the financial incentives 
driving Facebook would be better equipped to address this. 
 While it is impossible to simply oppose metrics, the 
harms caused when metrics are overemphasized include 
manipulation, gaming, a focus on short-term outcomes to 
the detriment of longer-term values, and other harmful 
consequences, particularly when done in an environment 
designed to exploit people’s impulses and weaknesses, 
such as most of our online ecosystem. The unreasonable 
effectiveness of metric optimization in current AI 
approaches is a fundamental challenge to the field, and 
yields an inherent contradiction: solely optimizing metrics 
leads to far from optimal outcomes. However, we provide 
evidence in this paper that  healthier use of metrics can be 
created by: (1) using a slate of metrics to get a fuller and 
more nuanced picture, (2) combining metrics with 
qualitative accounts, and (3) involving a range of 
stakeholders, including those who will be most impacted.  
This  framework may help address the core paradox of 
metric optimization within AI, and not solely relying on 
metric optimization may lead to a more optimal use of AI. 
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